Israel was surprised on 6 October 1973 because its intelligence chiefs believed Egypt and Syria would not attack and read the evidence through that belief. The…
After the 1974 disengagement and the Camp David Accords of 17 September 1978, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979.
The commission's final report ran to more than 1,500 pages, but only its introduction was made public.
The commission cleared Golda Meir of direct responsibility, but she announced her resignation on 11 April 1974 after public anger. Some accounts say 10 April.
The report held Chief of Staff David Elazar responsible and recommended removing him, Eli Zeira, three other officers and Southern Command's chief. It made no ruling on…
A US review found collection was adequate but analysts did not perceive the growing risk. It cited preconceptions and heavy reliance on Israeli assessments.
Resolution 338 passed on 22 October and 339 on 23 October. Ceasefires held on 24 and 25 October; the Km 101 agreement followed on 11 November.
At about 14:00 on 6 October, Egypt and Syria attacked on the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. Syrian forces took the Hermon outpost about 17:00.
Mossad chief Zvi Zamir relayed a message from Ashraf Marwan, dated 5 October, that attack would come on 6 October. It said dusk; the attack began at 14:00.
General Staff transcripts record Military Intelligence chief Eli Zeira putting the odds of a coordinated attack at lower than low the day before the war.
Israel's 1967 victory reinforced a belief that Arab states would not start a war they could not win, a belief later called the Concept.
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