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Indore · 1978-2024 · Maintenance, personal law and the Supreme Court

Shah Bano Case: A Timeline of India’s Landmark Maintenance Law

📅 Last updated: 19 November 2026⏱ 23 dated entries✎ By Nazish Fatima

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In short

Explore the Shah Bano case timeline, the 1985 Supreme Court verdict, the 1986 Muslim Women Act, the Danial Latifi judgment and the 2024 ruling.

Latest Story

In April 1978, Shah Bano Begum, then in her early sixties and turned out of her home after more than four decades of marriage, asked a Magistrate in Indore to order her husband to support her. Seven years later the Supreme Court agreed, and a claim for ₹179.20 a month became one of the most argued-over judgments in Indian history. This Shah Bano case timeline follows the dispute from the Magistrate’s court to the 1985 verdict, the 1986 law that tried to reverse it, and the 2001 and 2024 rulings that restored much of what it gave.

Read this first: three common errors

The ₹25 maintenance order came in August 1979, not 1978; Shah Bano filed in April 1978 and was divorced on 6 November 1978, while her petition was pending. The 1986 Act was not struck down: the Supreme Court upheld it in 2001 but read it to require provision for the woman’s future. And the judgment did not abolish iddat or Muslim personal law: it interpreted a secular statute that applies to everyone.

💡 Short Answer

The Shah Bano case is Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, decided by a five-judge Supreme Court bench on 23 April 1985. It held that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself can claim maintenance from her former husband under Section 125 CrPC, even after iddat. Parliament responded with the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Court upheld that Act in Danial Latifi (2001) but read it to require provision for her future, and in 2024 confirmed that Section 125 remains available too.

⚡ The Case at a Glance
Petition filedApril 1978, Magistrate, Indore
DivorceIrrevocable talaq, 6 November 1978
Supreme Court23 April 1985, five judges, unanimous
Maintenance upheld₹179.20 a month
Parliament’s responseMuslim Women Act, assent 19 May 1986
Latest rulingMohd. Abdul Samad, 10 July 2024
⚡ Quick Answers — AI Overview Ready

Shah Bano Case: Key Questions

What did the Supreme Court decide in 1985?
That Section 125 CrPC is a secular remedy against destitution that applies to divorced Muslim women who have not remarried and cannot maintain themselves, even after iddat; that mahr does not cancel the obligation; and that this did not conflict with Muslim personal law.
What did the 1986 Act do?
It created a separate scheme for divorced Muslim women: a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance from the husband within the iddat period, mahr and her property, with relatives or the State Wakf Board liable afterwards. Former spouses could opt for the CrPC instead.
How did Danial Latifi change things?
In 2001 the Supreme Court upheld the 1986 Act but held that the husband must, within iddat, make a fair provision for his former wife’s future, so his liability is not confined to the iddat period. That reading saved the Act from being struck down.
What is the law today?
Since Mohd. Abdul Samad (10 July 2024), a divorced Muslim woman can claim under the 1986 Act, under Section 125 CrPC, or both. For proceedings under the new code from 1 July 2024, the general provision is Section 144 of the BNSS.
📚 Key Takeaways

The Case in Ten Points

  • The claim: a maintenance petition by a 62-year-old wife, filed in April 1978 before she was divorced.
  • The divorce: an irrevocable talaq on 6 November 1978, with ₹3,000 mahr deposited in court.
  • The lower courts: ₹25 a month in August 1979, raised to ₹179.20 on 1 July 1980.
  • The verdict: five judges, unanimous, 23 April 1985: Section 125 applies whatever the parties’ religion.
  • The remark: the Court called Article 44, on a uniform civil code, “a dead letter”.
  • The backlash: protests by religious bodies and a Congress by-election loss in December 1985.
  • The law: the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, assent 19 May 1986.
  • The reading: Danial Latifi (2001) upheld it, but required provision for her future.
  • The reaffirmation: Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024): the Act is in addition to Section 125, not instead of it.
  • Today: Section 144 of the BNSS carries the general maintenance remedy forward.

Four Milestones, 1985 to 2024

A judgment, a law, a reading of that law, and a reaffirmation.

Four milestones of the Shah Bano case: 23 April 1985, the Supreme Court holds Section 125 CrPC applies to divorced Muslim women unable to maintain themselves; 19 May 1986, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act receives assent; 28 September 2001, Danial Latifi upholds the Act but requires provision for the woman's future; 10 July 2024, Mohd. Abdul Samad holds divorced Muslim women can also use Section 125.
From the 1985 verdict to the 2024 reaffirmation

A circle, not a line. Parliament’s 1986 law was widely understood as undoing the 1985 judgment. The Court’s two later rulings did not strike the law down. They read it, and the secular remedy beside it, so that the woman’s right to support survived.

The personal story was overtaken. Shah Bano received a modest monthly allowance, disowned the judgment under pressure within months, and died in 1992. The legal principle outlived her by decades.

What Was Actually at Stake

The sums behind a national controversy, from the 1985 judgment.

The money in the Shah Bano case: she asked for Rs 500 a month, the legal maximum, saying her husband earned about Rs 60,000 a year; he had paid Rs 200 a month for about two years and deposited Rs 3,000 as mahr; the Magistrate awarded Rs 25 a month in August 1979; the Madhya Pradesh High Court raised it to Rs 179.20 on 1 July 1980; the Supreme Court confirmed Rs 179.20 and awarded Rs 10,000 in costs.
Rs 500 claimed, Rs 179.20 confirmed

A small sum, a large principle. The amount confirmed in 1985 was ₹179.20 a month. The Supreme Court ordered the husband to pay ₹10,000 in costs, more than four years of that allowance.

Why the mahr mattered. Under Section 127(3)(b), a maintenance order could be cancelled if a divorced woman had received the whole sum payable “on divorce” under personal law. Khan argued his ₹3,000 was that sum. The Court held that mahr is a mark of respect for the wife, payable because of the marriage, not on divorce.

Shah Bano Case Timeline, Newest First

Tagged by phase: the dispute, the lower courts, the Supreme Court, Parliament and politics, and the laws that followed.

The disputeLower courtsSupreme CourtParliament and politicsLater law

A film, and a daughter’s objection Later law

Haq, released 7 November 2025Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore

What happened: Shah Bano’s daughter, Siddiqua Begum Khan, asked the Madhya Pradesh High Court to stop the release of Haq, a Hindi film inspired by the case, saying it used her mother’s life without the family’s consent and misrepresented it.

The ruling: Justice Pranay Verma dismissed the petition days before the release, noting that the film carried a disclaimer describing it as fiction inspired by the 1985 judgment, and that no violation of privacy or reputation had been shown.

Why it matters: Forty years after the judgment, the case was still contested ground, this time over who gets to tell the story of the woman at its centre.

The film is based on a fictionalised book, Bano: Bharat Ki Beti by Jigna Vora.
10 Jul 2024

Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana Supreme Court

2024 INSC 506Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih

The dispute: A Family Court in Telangana had ordered Mohd. Abdul Samad to pay his divorced wife ₹20,000 a month as interim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The High Court cut it to ₹10,000. He appealed, arguing that the 1986 Act barred a divorced Muslim woman from using Section 125 at all.

The ruling: Both judges wrote separate, concurring opinions and dismissed the appeal. The 1986 Act is “not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC but in addition to” it, so a woman divorced under Muslim law can use either law, or both. The same applies to the 2019 law on triple talaq. Any amount paid under the 1986 Act is taken into account under Section 127(3)(b).

Why it matters: It settled a question High Courts had answered differently for decades, and overruled the decisions that had shut divorced Muslim women out of Section 125.

Justice Nagarathna’s opinion went further, urging husbands to give homemakers access to money of their own, for instance through a joint bank account.
1 Jul 2024

Section 125 becomes Section 144 of the BNSS Later law

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023Replaces the CrPC

What happened: The new criminal procedure code came into force. The maintenance provision for wives, children and parents is now Section 144, and its explanation still treats a divorced woman who has not remarried as a “wife”.

The overlap: The Samad appeal, decided nine days later, had been filed under the old Section 125, so the Court spoke in CrPC terms. The principle carries over to Section 144.

Proceedings begun before 1 July 2024 continue under the CrPC.
31 Jul 2019

Triple talaq becomes a criminal offence Later law

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019Effective from 19 September 2018

What happened: Parliament made pronouncing instant triple talaq void and punishable with up to three years in prison. Section 5 gives a woman so divorced a right to a subsistence allowance from her husband.

The link to Shah Bano: Mohammed Ahmed Khan had divorced Shah Bano in exactly this way in 1978. The Samad judgment of 2024 confirmed that this allowance is in addition to, not instead of, Section 125.

The Act was preceded by three ordinances, the first in September 2018.
22 Aug 2017

Shayara Bano: instant triple talaq set aside Supreme Court

Shayara Bano v. Union of IndiaFive-judge bench, 3-2

What happened: A Constitution Bench held, by majority, that talaq-e-biddat, or instant triple talaq, was invalid.

The connection: Like Shah Bano, the case began with one woman’s petition and became a national debate about personal law, Parliament and the courts. This time Parliament followed the judgment rather than reversing it.

Shayara Bano is from Kashipur in Uttarakhand.
28 Sep 2001

Danial Latifi: the 1986 Act upheld, and read wide Supreme Court

Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740Five-judge bench

What happened: Fifteen years after Shah Bano’s own lawyer filed the challenge, a Constitution Bench of Justices G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju and Shivaraj V. Patil upheld the 1986 Act. Justice Rajendra Babu wrote the judgment.

The key reading: Section 3(1)(a) requires a “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid” within the iddat period. The Court read “within” to mean the husband must make provision for her future during iddat, not merely pay for those three months. His liability “is not confined to iddat period”.

Why it matters: By reading the Act this way, the Court found it did not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21. In practice, it restored much of what the Act had been meant to take away.

High Court decisions that had read the Act narrowly were overruled.

The ₹500 cap on maintenance is removed Later law

Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001Section 125

What happened: Parliament removed the ₹500 monthly ceiling on maintenance under Section 125, leaving the amount to the Magistrate.

The context: Shah Bano had asked for the maximum ₹500 in 1978. She was awarded ₹25, then ₹179.20.

The cap had been a common reason why women chose lump-sum provision under the 1986 Act instead.

Shah Bano dies The dispute

IndoreBorn c. 1916

What happened: Shah Bano Begum died in 1992, reportedly of a brain haemorrhage. She did not live to see the Danial Latifi judgment.

Her legacy: Her name became shorthand for a debate she had not set out to start: about personal law, secular remedies and the Uniform Civil Code.

Mohammed Ahmed Khan, her former husband, is reported to have died in 2006.
19 May 1986

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 Parliament and politics

Act 25 of 1986Assent of the President

What it says: Section 3 entitles a divorced Muslim woman to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance from her former husband, made and paid within the iddat period, plus her mahr and the property given to her. Section 4 makes her relatives, and failing them the State Wakf Board, liable to maintain her afterwards if she cannot maintain herself.

The opt-in: Section 5 lets the two former spouses declare, jointly or separately, that they prefer to be governed by Sections 125 to 128 of the CrPC.

How it was read: The government and its supporters presented it as limiting the husband’s duty to the iddat period. The wording, “within” rather than “for”, would decide its meaning 15 years later.

Parliament had debated it through spring 1986; the Rajya Sabha took it up on 8 May.

The Bill is introduced, and a minister quits Parliament and politics

Lok Sabha, 25 February 1986Rajiv Gandhi government

What happened: The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill was taken up in the Lok Sabha on 25 February 1986. With a majority of more than 400 seats, the government had the numbers to pass it.

The resignation: Arif Mohammad Khan, a Minister of State who had defended the judgment in the Lok Sabha the previous August, resigned from the government in protest at the Bill. He later served as Governor of Kerala and of Bihar.

The opposition: Women’s organisations, the Left, the BJP and some Muslim liberals opposed the Bill; the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and others supported it.

Commentators have long linked the Bill to other decisions of the same months, a connection the government denied.

A by-election loss in Kishanganj Parliament and politics

BiharSyed Shahabuddin elected

What happened: Syed Shahabuddin, a prominent critic of the judgment, won the Kishanganj Lok Sabha by-election in Bihar. The result was widely read as a sign of Muslim anger at the Congress, which had initially backed the verdict.

Why it mattered: Accounts of the period say the result, together with pressure from Congress leaders, pushed the government towards legislation.

The Congress had won 404 of the Lok Sabha seats contested in December 1984.
Late 1985

Shah Bano disowns the judgment The dispute

Under community pressureIndore

What happened: Facing pressure from religious leaders and her community, Shah Bano publicly said she rejected the Supreme Court’s verdict and asked that it be withdrawn, according to accounts of the period.

Why it matters: The woman who had won the case was presented by its opponents as having renounced it. Her own wishes became part of the political argument.

The maintenance order itself was never set aside.
23 Aug 1985

Arif Mohammad Khan defends the verdict in the Lok Sabha Parliament and politics

Debate on a private member’s billMinister of State

What happened: Arif Mohammad Khan, a Muslim minister in the Congress government, made a long speech in the Lok Sabha defending the judgment and citing the Quran in its support. He later said he had done so at the Prime Minister’s request.

The other side: Ziaur Rahman Ansari, another minister, attacked the judgment in the same debate. Muslim League MP G.M. Banatwala had moved a private member’s bill to exclude Muslims from Section 125.

Within six months the government had changed course.
23 Apr 1985

The Supreme Court rules for Shah Bano Supreme Court

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556CJI Y.V. Chandrachud for a five-judge bench

What happened: A unanimous Constitution Bench of Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Justices D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra dismissed the husband’s appeal and confirmed the High Court’s order. He was ordered to pay her ₹10,000 in costs.

What it held: Section 125 is secular and applies whatever the religion of the parties. A divorced wife who has not remarried and cannot maintain herself can claim maintenance beyond iddat. Mahr is not a sum payable “on divorce” that cancels the order under Section 127(3)(b). And there was “no conflict” with Muslim personal law, citing verses 241 and 242 of the second chapter of the Quran.

The remark: “Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter,” the Court said, urging Parliament towards a common civil code. The comment did as much as the holding to make the case explosive.

The Court left it open to her to seek a higher allowance under Section 127(1) if circumstances changed.
3 Feb 1981

Referred to a larger bench Supreme Court

Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981Justices Murtaza Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan

What happened: A two-judge bench doubted two earlier three-judge rulings, Bai Tahira (1979) and Fuzlunbi (1980), that had applied Section 125 to divorced Muslim women. It sent the appeal to a larger bench.

Who joined: The All India Muslim Personal Law Board and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind intervened in support of the husband. Shah Bano was represented by Danial Latifi.

It took four more years for the five-judge bench to decide.
1 Jul 1980

The High Court raises it to ₹179.20 Lower courts

Madhya Pradesh High CourtCriminal Revision No. 320 of 1979

What happened: On Shah Bano’s revision petition, the High Court increased her maintenance to ₹179.20 a month.

What followed: Mohammed Ahmed Khan sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that he had met every obligation he had under Muslim law.

The figure, ₹179.20, is the amount the Supreme Court finally confirmed in 1985.

The Magistrate awards ₹25 a month Lower courts

Judicial Magistrate (First Class), IndoreSection 125 CrPC

What happened: The Magistrate directed Khan to pay Shah Bano ₹25 a month, a sum the Supreme Court later called “princely”, with evident irony.

The gap: She had asked for ₹500, the legal maximum, saying he earned about ₹60,000 a year.

This order came in August 1979, not 1978 as some accounts say.
1979-80

Bai Tahira and Fuzlunbi Later law

Three-judge benches led by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer(1979) 2 SCR 75; (1980) 3 SCR 1127

What happened: In two cases the Supreme Court held that Section 125 applied to divorced Muslim women, and that a sum paid under personal law cancels the order only if it is a reasonable substitute for maintenance.

Why it matters: Shah Bano’s case was the challenge to these rulings. The 1985 Constitution Bench confirmed them.

Two other Muslim women had won maintenance this way before Shah Bano, with far less attention.
6 Nov 1978

Divorced by irrevocable talaq The dispute

Mid-proceedingsMahr of ₹3,000 deposited

What happened: While her petition was pending, Khan divorced her by an irrevocable talaq. He argued that she was no longer his wife, that he had paid her ₹200 a month for about two years, and that he had deposited ₹3,000 in court as mahr for the iddat period.

The question it raised: Did divorce, and payment under personal law, end a husband’s duty under Section 125? That became the question the Supreme Court had to answer.

She was 62 at the time.

Shah Bano files under Section 125 The dispute

Judicial Magistrate, IndoreClaim: ₹500 a month

What happened: Shah Bano petitioned the Magistrate for maintenance of ₹500 a month, the most the law then allowed, citing her husband’s professional income of about ₹60,000 a year.

The law she used: Section 125 lets a Magistrate order a man of sufficient means to maintain a wife who cannot maintain herself. Its Explanation (b) counts a divorced woman who has not remarried as a wife.

The case is often described as a divorce case. It began as a maintenance claim by a wife who had not yet been divorced.
1 Apr 1974

The new CrPC counts a divorced wife as a wife Later law

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Section 125, Explanation (b)

What happened: The 1973 Code replaced the 1898 Code. Its maintenance section, Section 125, expressly included a divorced woman who had not remarried within “wife”. Section 127(3)(b) let a husband have the order cancelled if she had received the whole sum payable “on divorce” under personal law.

Why it matters: That pairing of provisions was the legal battleground of the Shah Bano case.

The provision descends from Section 488 of the 1898 Code, described in the nineteenth century as a means of preventing vagrancy.

Turned out of the matrimonial home The dispute

After 43 years of marriageIndore

What happened: Mohammed Ahmed Khan, a well-known Indore advocate, made Shah Bano leave the marital home. He had taken a second wife years earlier.

The arrangement: He paid her ₹200 a month for about two years, by his own account, before the payments stopped.

She had brought up five children, three sons and two daughters.

The marriage The dispute

IndoreShah Bano and Mohammed Ahmed Khan

What happened: Shah Bano married Mohammed Ahmed Khan, an advocate. They had three sons and two daughters.

Context: Accounts describe them as cousins. Khan later married a second wife, Halima Begum.

The marriage lasted more than four decades before it ended in court.

What the Supreme Court Held in 1985

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556, AIR 1985 SC 945.

Five holdings of the Shah Bano judgment, 23 April 1985: Section 125 CrPC is secular and applies irrespective of religion; a divorced woman who has not remarried is a wife for Section 125; maintenance can continue beyond iddat if she cannot maintain herself; mahr is not a sum payable on divorce and does not cancel the order; and there is no conflict with Muslim personal law, citing Quran verses 2:241 and 2:242.
Five holdings
Husband’s argumentThe Court’s answer
Divorce ended her status as a wifeExplanation (b) to Section 125 expressly includes a divorced woman who has not remarried
Muslim personal law limits his duty to iddatThat rule applies where she can maintain herself; it does not cover destitution
Paying mahr cancels the order under Section 127(3)(b)Mahr is not a sum payable “on divorce”
The judgment interferes with religionNo conflict: the Quran itself imposes a duty of provision for divorced wives

The part that was not needed. The Court added that Article 44 had “remained a dead letter” and that “a common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration”. It was an observation, not a holding, but it turned a maintenance case into a debate about the Uniform Civil Code.

The Court interpreting scripture. Critics objected less to the result than to judges reading the Quran for themselves. The Muslim Personal Law Board, an intervener, would raise the same objection in 2001.

Parliament’s Response: The 1986 Act

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (Act 25 of 1986), assent 19 May 1986.

What the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 provides: Section 3, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance from the former husband made and paid within the iddat period, plus mahr and her property; Section 4, after iddat, maintenance from relatives who would inherit from her, and failing them the State Wakf Board; Section 5, the former spouses may opt to be governed by Sections 125 to 128 CrPC.
Sections 3, 4 and 5
QuestionSection 125 CrPC1986 Act
Who paysFormer husbandFormer husband within iddat; then relatives or the Wakf Board
FormMonthly allowanceProvision and maintenance, often a lump sum
Limit (until 2001)₹500 a monthNo ceiling
ConditionShe cannot maintain herselfFair provision regardless; Section 4 if she cannot maintain herself

The politics. The Congress had won more than 400 Lok Sabha seats in 1984 and initially backed the verdict. After protests by religious organisations and a by-election defeat in Kishanganj, the government brought the Bill in February 1986. Arif Mohammad Khan resigned from the ministry in protest.

The fine print. Section 3 spoke of provision “made and paid within the iddat period”. Its supporters took this to mean maintenance only for iddat. The words would be read differently.

Danial Latifi: “Within”, Not “For”

How the Supreme Court saved the 1986 Act by reading it, 28 September 2001.

Two readings of Section 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act: the narrow reading, held by the Act's supporters and some High Courts, was maintenance only for the iddat period of about three months; the Danial Latifi reading, 28 September 2001, is a reasonable and fair provision for her future, extending beyond iddat, that must be made within iddat. On that reading the Act does not violate Articles 14, 15 and 21.
Two readings of one clause

Why the Court did it. If the Act had left divorced Muslim women with less protection than other women under Section 125, the bench reasoned, it would face a serious challenge under Articles 14 and 21. Reading it to require provision for her future avoided that, so the Act stood.

What changed in practice. Courts began ordering substantial lump sums within iddat to provide for a woman’s future. With no ceiling, some women did better under the 1986 Act than under Section 125’s former ₹500 cap.

The Law Today

From Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024) and the BNSS.

Which law a divorced woman can use after Mohd. Abdul Samad, 10 July 2024: non-Muslim divorced women, Section 125 CrPC; Muslim women married and divorced under the Special Marriage Act, Section 125 plus that Act; Muslim women divorced under Muslim law, the 1986 Act or Section 125 or both, with any 1986 Act order counted under Section 127(3)(b); women divorced by illegal triple talaq, Section 5 of the 2019 Act or Section 125. From 1 July 2024, Section 144 BNSS replaces Section 125 CrPC for new proceedings.
Who can use which law
IssueWhere the law stands
Maintenance after divorceSection 125 CrPC (now BNSS 144) covers a divorced woman who has not remarried and cannot maintain herself
MahrDoes not by itself end the statutory remedy
IddatMaintenance under Section 125 can continue beyond it
1986 ActValid; requires fair provision for her future, made within iddat
Choice of remedyEither law or both, per Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024)
Triple talaqVoid and punishable since the 2019 Act; Section 5 allowance is additional

A settled question, finally. For nearly four decades, High Courts disagreed on whether the 1986 Act shut divorced Muslim women out of Section 125. Samad held that the Act is “not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC but in addition to” it, and overruled the decisions that said otherwise.

Law and practice. A legal right does not guarantee payment. Delays in maintenance cases and difficulty enforcing orders remain common complaints for women of every community.

By the Numbers

The Shah Bano case in numbers: married in 1932; 43 years of marriage before she was turned out in 1975; 5 children; Rs 25 a month from the Magistrate; Rs 179.20 confirmed by the Supreme Court; 5 judges, unanimous; 7 years from petition to judgment; 15 years from the 1986 challenge to Danial Latifi; 39 years from the verdict to Mohd. Abdul Samad.
Key figures

Who Was Who

Petitioner in 1978

Shah Bano Begum

An Indore woman, married in 1932, mother of five, who claimed maintenance at 62. She died in 1992.

Appellant

Mohammed Ahmed Khan

A well-known Indore advocate who divorced her in 1978 and took the case to the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice

Y.V. Chandrachud

Wrote the unanimous 1985 judgment for a five-judge Constitution Bench.

Her lawyer

Danial Latifi

Represented Shah Bano in the Supreme Court, then challenged the 1986 Act in Writ Petition 868 of 1986.

Prime Minister

Rajiv Gandhi

His government first backed the verdict, then brought the 1986 Act.

Minister who resigned

Arif Mohammad Khan

Defended the verdict in the Lok Sabha in August 1985 and quit the ministry over the Bill.

2001 bench

Justice S. Rajendra Babu

Wrote Danial Latifi, reading Section 3 to require provision for the woman’s future.

2024 bench

Justices Nagarathna and Masih

Held in separate concurring opinions that the 1986 Act adds to Section 125 rather than replacing it.

Did You Know?

  • Not a divorce case at first: she filed for maintenance as a wife; the divorce came seven months later.
  • Not the first: two other Muslim women had won Section 125 maintenance in the Supreme Court in 1979 and 1980.
  • Costs exceeded the award: the ₹10,000 costs were worth more than four years of her monthly allowance.
  • Her lawyer kept going: Danial Latifi challenged the law that followed, and his name is on the 2001 judgment.
  • Thirty-nine years later: the Supreme Court in 2024 confirmed the principle it first set out in 1985.
  • Still contested: in November 2025 her daughter went to court over a film inspired by the case.

Explore More Timelines

People Also Ask

What is the Shah Bano case?
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum is the 1985 Supreme Court case in which a five-judge bench held that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself can claim maintenance from her former husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a secular law. Shah Bano, from Indore, had filed for maintenance in 1978 after 43 years of marriage.
What was the Shah Bano judgment of 1985?
On 23 April 1985 a unanimous Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud dismissed the husband's appeal and confirmed maintenance of Rs 179.20 a month. It held that Section 125 applies regardless of religion, that maintenance can continue beyond iddat, and that payment of mahr does not end the obligation.
Why did Parliament pass the Muslim Women Act in 1986?
The judgment provoked protests from Muslim religious organisations, who saw it as interference in personal law, and the Congress lost a by-election in Kishanganj in December 1985. The Rajiv Gandhi government responded with the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which received assent on 19 May 1986.
Did the 1986 Act overturn Shah Bano?
It was meant to. Its supporters read it as limiting a husband's duty to the iddat period. But in Danial Latifi (2001) the Supreme Court read Section 3 to require a fair provision for the woman's future, made within iddat, and in Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024) held that Section 125 remained available as well.
Can a divorced Muslim woman claim maintenance under Section 125 today?
Yes. In Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, decided on 10 July 2024, the Supreme Court held that the 1986 Act is in addition to Section 125, not in place of it, so a divorced Muslim woman can use either law or both. For new proceedings, Section 144 of the BNSS is the equivalent provision.
What happened to Shah Bano after the case?
Under pressure from her community, she publicly disowned the judgment in late 1985, according to accounts of the period. She died in Indore in 1992. In November 2025 her daughter unsuccessfully asked the Madhya Pradesh High Court to stop the release of the film Haq, which is inspired by the case.

Frequently Asked Questions

Based on the 1985, 2001 and 2024 Supreme Court judgments and the 1986 Act.

Who was Shah Bano?
Shah Bano Begum was a woman from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, who married advocate Mohammed Ahmed Khan in 1932 and had five children with him. She was 62 when he divorced her in 1978. Her claim for maintenance became one of the best-known cases in Indian legal history.
When did Shah Bano file her case?
In April 1978, before the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Indore, under Section 125 of the CrPC. She asked for Rs 500 a month, the legal maximum then, saying her husband earned about Rs 60,000 a year.
When was Shah Bano divorced?
On 6 November 1978, while her maintenance petition was pending. Khan pronounced an irrevocable talaq and argued that, having paid mahr and maintenance for the iddat period, he owed her nothing more.
How much maintenance did the Magistrate award?
Rs 25 a month, in August 1979. The Supreme Court later called it a princely sum, ironically. The order is sometimes wrongly dated to 1978.
What did the Madhya Pradesh High Court decide?
On 1 July 1980, on Shah Bano's revision petition, it raised the maintenance to Rs 179.20 a month. Her husband then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Who were the judges in the Shah Bano case?
Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Justices D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra. Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote the unanimous judgment.
What is the citation of the Shah Bano case?
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 556, AIR 1985 SC 945, 1985 SCR (3) 844, decided on 23 April 1985 in Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981.
Why was the case sent to a five-judge bench?
On 3 February 1981 a two-judge bench doubted two earlier three-judge rulings, Bai Tahira (1979) and Fuzlunbi (1980), which had applied Section 125 to divorced Muslim women. It referred the appeal to a larger bench, which upheld those rulings.
What is Section 125 CrPC?
A provision that lets a Magistrate order a person of sufficient means to pay a monthly allowance to a wife, child or parent who cannot maintain themselves. Its Explanation (b) counts a divorced woman who has not remarried as a wife. It is a secular, summary remedy against destitution.
What is iddat?
The waiting period a Muslim woman observes after divorce or her husband's death, usually about three menstrual cycles or three months after divorce. Under classical Muslim law, a husband's duty of maintenance after divorce lasts only through iddat.
What is mahr?
The sum or property a Muslim husband gives or promises his wife on marriage. Shah Bano's husband argued that paying her Rs 3,000 mahr ended his obligation. The Court held mahr is a mark of respect for the wife, not an amount payable on divorce.
What did the Court say about the Quran?
It cited verses 241 and 242 of the second chapter of the Quran and held that they impose an obligation on a Muslim husband to provide for his divorced wife. It concluded there was no conflict between Section 125 and Muslim personal law where a divorced wife is destitute.
What did the Court say about a Uniform Civil Code?
It said Article 44 of the Constitution, which directs the state to try to secure a uniform civil code, had remained a dead letter, and that a common civil code would help national integration. The remark was not necessary to decide the case but became central to the controversy.
Who opposed the Shah Bano judgment?
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and many Muslim clerics and politicians, who saw it as interference with personal law. Syed Shahabuddin, who won the Kishanganj by-election in December 1985, was a leading critic.
Who supported the judgment?
Women's organisations, the Left, the BJP, many legal scholars and some Muslim reformers. Arif Mohammad Khan, then a Minister of State, defended it in the Lok Sabha on 23 August 1985 and later resigned over the government's Bill.
When was the Muslim Women Act passed?
The Bill was taken up in the Lok Sabha on 25 February 1986, debated through the spring, taken up by the Rajya Sabha on 8 May, and received the President's assent on 19 May 1986 as Act 25 of 1986.
What does Section 3 of the 1986 Act provide?
It entitles a divorced Muslim woman to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband within the iddat period, to her mahr, and to the property given to her before, at or after marriage.
What does Section 4 of the 1986 Act provide?
If a divorced woman cannot maintain herself after iddat, the Magistrate can order her relatives who would inherit from her, including her children and parents, to maintain her. If they cannot, the State Wakf Board can be ordered to pay.
What is Section 5 of the 1986 Act?
It allows the divorced woman and her former husband to declare, by affidavit or written declaration at the first hearing, that they prefer to be governed by Sections 125 to 128 of the CrPC.
Who challenged the 1986 Act?
Danial Latifi, the lawyer who had represented Shah Bano in the Supreme Court, filed Writ Petition 868 of 1986, arguing the Act violated Articles 14 and 21. Several other petitions were heard with it.
What did the Supreme Court decide in Danial Latifi?
On 28 September 2001 a five-judge bench upheld the Act but held that a husband must make a reasonable and fair provision for his divorced wife's future, extending beyond iddat, and must make it within iddat. So read, the Act did not violate Articles 14, 15 and 21.
Is the 1986 Act still in force?
Yes. It has not been repealed. The Supreme Court has read it alongside Section 125, most recently in Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024), which held the two remedies exist side by side.
What did the Supreme Court decide in Mohd. Abdul Samad?
On 10 July 2024 Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih, in separate concurring opinions, upheld a maintenance order under Section 125 for a divorced Muslim woman and held that the 1986 Act does not displace Section 125. A woman can choose either law or both.
How much maintenance was involved in the Samad case?
A Family Court had ordered Rs 20,000 a month as interim maintenance. The Telangana High Court reduced it to Rs 10,000, and the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order when it dismissed the husband's appeal.
What is Section 144 of the BNSS?
The maintenance provision of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in force from 1 July 2024. It replaces Section 125 of the CrPC and keeps a divorced woman who has not remarried within the meaning of wife.
Was there a cap on maintenance under Section 125?
Yes. Until 2001 the monthly allowance could not exceed Rs 500. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001 removed the ceiling.
How is the Shah Bano case connected to the triple talaq case?
Shah Bano was divorced by instant triple talaq in 1978. In Shayara Bano (2017) the Supreme Court set aside instant triple talaq, and the 2019 Act made it a criminal offence. The Samad judgment held that the 2019 Act's subsistence allowance is in addition to Section 125.
Did the Shah Bano judgment abolish iddat or Muslim personal law?
No. It interpreted a secular statute that applies to everyone. It held that where a divorced wife cannot maintain herself, Section 125 continues to apply after iddat, and that this did not conflict with Muslim personal law as the Court read it.
Why is the Shah Bano case politically important?
It became a defining test of secularism, minority rights and gender justice. Critics of the 1986 Act called it appeasement; its supporters called it respect for personal law. The debate it started over a Uniform Civil Code continues.
Where can I read the Shah Bano judgment?
The full text of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, dated 23 April 1985, is on Indian Kanoon. The Danial Latifi and Mohd. Abdul Samad judgments are also linked in our sources.

⚠️ Editorial Note: What We Checked

We checked the brief we started from against the three Supreme Court judgments. The Magistrate’s ₹25 order was made in August 1979, not 1978, and the High Court’s order is dated 1 July 1980. The divorce was on 6 November 1978, after she filed. In the 2024 Samad case, the Family Court’s ₹20,000 a month was interim maintenance, which the High Court cut to ₹10,000 before the Supreme Court dismissed the husband’s appeal; and both judges, not only Justice Nagarathna, wrote separate concurring opinions, with Justice Masih writing the lead judgment. The judgment also covered the 2019 triple talaq law. One judgment link in the brief returned an error, so we cite Indian Kanoon instead. Exact dates for the Lok Sabha vote on the 1986 Bill, Arif Mohammad Khan’s resignation and Shah Bano’s public statement in late 1985 are not given where we could not confirm them from records. This article describes court judgments and laws and is not legal advice.

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