The Russia–Ukraine War: Every Verified Milestone Since 1991

Long-range strikes intensify while an “air ceasefire” is floated

Background and military developments: by mid-2026 the war had settled into deep-strike exchange — Ukraine striking Russian energy and industrial targets, Russia launching mass drone and missile salvos at Ukrainian cities, neither producing decisive territorial change. Ukraine said it hit two of Russia’s largest oil refineries on 29 July 2026, hours after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met the US president in Washington; Zelenskyy had addressed bipartisan US senators at the Capitol on 28 July.

Diplomatic and humanitarian position: on 26 July Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said it was “too early” to comment on reported US–Ukrainian discussions of a partial ceasefire covering aerial attacks; a Ukrainian source told Reuters such a proposal had been prepared for Moscow. Russia had not accepted it as of 30 July. UN monitors recorded at least 293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured in June 2026, the deadliest month for civilians since April 2022.

A three-day Victory Day truce, and a tribunal takes institutional shape

Diplomatic developments: a truce covering 9–11 May 2026, timed to Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, included a temporary suspension of large-scale operations and a planned prisoner exchange. It was widely described as a humanitarian pause rather than a settlement. Both sides accused the other of violations, and sporadic hostilities continued in several frontline areas.

International law: on 15 May 2026 in Chișinău, 34 Council of Europe member states, together with Australia, Costa Rica and the European Union, adopted the resolution establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Steering Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Its judicial seat is to be in The Hague, and it is intended to try senior political and military leaders for aggression committed since February 2022.

A 32-hour truce, 175 prisoners exchanged, and 469 alleged violations

What was agreed: after the Abu Dhabi rounds, both governments needed something visible on the ground. The truce began at 13:00 UTC on 11 April 2026 and expired on 13 April — roughly 32 hours. President Zelenskyy had proposed it about a week earlier; President Vladimir Putin set its duration. Terms covered a temporary stop to offensive operations, reduced artillery and missile strikes, and respect for humanitarian conditions along the front. Immediately beforehand, 175 detainees were exchanged, including 27 Ukrainian officers — the 72nd such exchange of the war.

Outcome: both sides reported violations. Ukraine claimed 469 by Russian forces, mostly drone attacks; Russia alleged a smaller number by Ukraine. Full-scale fighting resumed across multiple sectors immediately on expiry.

Abu Dhabi round two: 314 prisoners exchanged, territory left to leaders

Diplomatic developments: a second round of US-brokered trilateral talks concluded in Abu Dhabi on 5 February 2026. US envoy Steve Witkoff called two days of negotiations “detailed and productive” while noting that “significant work remains”. The parties agreed an exchange of 314 prisoners — 157 from each side, the first swap in five months, plus the return of three civilians from Russia’s Kursk region. Officials indicated the next round would likely be held in the United States and that the most sensitive questions, above all territory, were reserved for heads of state.

Humanitarian record: on 16 February 2026 the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission published its “Four Years On” fact sheet, consolidating verified casualty and displacement data for the full-scale phase.

Trilateral talks open in Abu Dhabi; the EU’s €90 billion loan and tribunal funding begin

Diplomatic developments: the American framework of November 2025 had survived Geneva in reduced form; the task was to convert a document into a process with Russian participation. Reporting places the first trilateral Russia–US–Ukraine talks of 2026 in Abu Dhabi in late January, with a second round in early February. Separately, European discussions in Paris examined proposals under which the United Kingdom and France would establish military support hubs in Ukraine as part of a post-settlement guarantee architecture; those proposals remained unagreed.

Economic and legal developments: the European Council’s December decision took effect — a €90 billion loan for Ukraine covering 2026–2027, financed by EU borrowing on capital markets and secured by the EU budget rather than directly by Russian assets, after Belgium objected to the original design. From January 2026 the EU also committed €10 million to the Council of Europe’s Special Tribunal Advance Team.

The ICJ admits Russia’s counter-claims; the EU immobilises €210 billion indefinitely

Court ruling: Ukraine’s Genocide Convention case, filed on 26 February 2022, had already been narrowed at the preliminary-objections stage. On 5 December 2025 the International Court of Justice, by eleven votes to four, found Russia’s eight counter-claims alleging genocide by Ukraine admissible, allowing them to proceed alongside Ukraine’s claim. Admissibility is a procedural finding about whether a claim may be heard; it says nothing about merit. The order extended proceedings into 2027.

Financial developments: on 11 December 2025 the EU moved to immobilise Russian sovereign assets in Europe indefinitely, removing the periodic unanimous renewal that Hungary or Slovakia could have blocked. The bulk of roughly €210 billion sits with Euroclear, a Belgian clearing house. Russia’s central bank subsequently filed a claim in a Moscow court seeking about USD 230 billion in damages from Euroclear.

A 28-point American plan, cut to 19 points in Geneva

What the plan contained: Washington circulated the most detailed settlement framework yet produced by any third party. The original 28-point draft reportedly required Ukraine to cede territory, cap the size of its armed forces and forgo NATO membership, in exchange for Russian commitments to end attacks. It drew immediate objections from Kyiv and European capitals.

Negotiations: US, Ukrainian and European officials met in Geneva on 23 November 2025 and narrowed the text to a 19-point framework. A Ukrainian participant said contested provisions had been softened or reshaped, with the hardest questions deliberately reserved for the two presidents. Technical talks continued in Abu Dhabi and US envoys travelled to Moscow. No version was signed by Russia.

A tribunal is signed into being; summitry resumes; the oil price cap is cut

International law: on 25 June 2025, President Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset signed the agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. It exists because the ICC cannot exercise aggression jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state in this situation — a gap in the Rome Statute regime this instrument is designed to fill.

Diplomacy and economic measures: a third round of Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul in late July 2025 produced little beyond further humanitarian exchanges, and an August summit in Alaska restarted leader-level US–Russia contact without producing a ceasefire. From 3 September 2025 the EU and UK lowered the price cap on Russian crude from USD 60 to USD 47.60 a barrel, recalculated every six months at a 15 per cent discount to a 22-week average.

Istanbul: the first direct talks since 2022, and a 1,000-for-1,000 exchange

What happened: after European leaders pressed to extend the short ceasefire Russia announced around Victory Day, President Putin countered with a proposal for direct bilateral talks in Istanbul — the venue of the failed March 2022 round. Delegations met face to face on 16 May 2025, the first direct negotiations since 2022. Neither president attended and the delegations were led at deputy-minister level, which set expectations low. The single concrete outcome was the largest prisoner exchange of the war — over 1,000 detainees released by each side, carried out over several days.

International response: European governments welcomed the resumption of contact while cautioning that a humanitarian exchange is not a ceasefire. Türkiye reinforced its position as the one NATO member both parties would meet in.

A partial ceasefire on energy targets, a suspension of US aid, and a minerals agreement

Developments: a change of administration in Washington brought a sharply different approach, combining pressure on Kyiv with direct outreach to Moscow. After the United States suspended military aid and intelligence sharing, Ukraine agreed in March 2025 to a proposed 30-day ceasefire. Russia did not accept a general ceasefire, but President Putin said Russia would observe a 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, subject to conditions; implementation was contested by both sides. At the end of April the United States and Ukraine concluded a critical minerals agreement giving long-term American access to Ukrainian mineral resources. In mid-April senior US officials indicated Washington was prepared to step back from mediation without progress.

Russian pipeline gas stops flowing through Ukraine after 34 years

Background and event: Soviet-era pipelines across Ukraine carried Russian gas to Europe continuously through the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, the annexation of Crimea and nearly three years of full-scale war. A five-year transit contract signed in 2019 expired at the end of 2024, and on the morning of 1 January 2025 the flow stopped. Ukraine declined to renew, citing a policy of cutting funding for Russia’s war effort and alignment with EU energy-independence goals — a decision costing it an estimated USD 450–500 million a year in transit fees.

Economic effects: Slovakia and Hungary, still dependent on the route, objected, and a Slovakia–Ukraine dispute followed. Remaining EU volumes shifted to liquefied natural gas and alternative pipelines, raising prices in the short term without the shortages seen in 2022.

Arrest warrants for Russia’s military leadership, EU accession talks, and a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk

International law: on 5 March 2024 ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Lieutenant General Sergei Kobylash and Admiral Viktor Sokolov. On 24 June 2024 the Court issued warrants for former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov, finding reasonable grounds to believe they bore responsibility for directing attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure between 10 October 2022 and 9 March 2023 — charged as war crimes and as the crime against humanity of inhumane acts. Russia rejected the warrants and does not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction.

Diplomacy and military developments: some 90 delegations attended a peace summit at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, in June; a majority endorsed a communiqué on nuclear safety, food security and prisoners, though several large states declined to sign and Russia was not invited. On 25 June 2024 the EU formally opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, and G7 leaders agreed a USD 50 billion loan serviced by profits from immobilised Russian assets. Ukrainian forces crossed into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024 while Russian forces advanced in eastern Donetsk region.

The counteroffensive, the end of the grain deal, and a warrant for a head of state

International law: on 17 March 2023 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and children’s rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova, alleging responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. It was the first ICC warrant against a sitting head of state of a permanent Security Council member. Moscow called the warrants void.

Military and food security: a long-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive began in June and continued into the autumn, achieving limited gains against dense minefields and layered defences. On 6 June 2023 the Kakhovka dam was destroyed, flooding communities downstream and draining the reservoir cooling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant; responsibility remains disputed. On 17 July 2023 Russia ceased participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and Ukraine responded by opening a corridor hugging the western Black Sea coast under its own protection, eventually exceeding pre-deal export volumes.

The energy war begins, and the oil price cap takes effect

Military developments: after battlefield reverses in the autumn, Russia shifted to a sustained campaign against Ukraine’s electricity system. Systematic missile and drone strikes on generation and transmission infrastructure began on 10 October 2022, days after an explosion damaged the Crimean Bridge. Rolling blackouts affected millions of households through the winter. These strikes later formed the factual basis of the ICC warrants issued in June 2024.

Economic measures: on 5 December 2022 the EU embargo on seaborne Russian crude took effect alongside a G7 price cap of USD 60 a barrel, enforced through the insurance and shipping services Western firms dominate. A cap on refined products followed in February 2023. The design deliberately kept Russian oil flowing to world markets while compressing revenue per barrel — an explicit trade-off between pressure and price stability.

Mobilisation, claimed annexations, and the retreat from Kherson

Military developments: a rapid Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv region in September 2022 recovered thousands of square kilometres in days. Russia announced a partial mobilisation of about 300,000 reservists on 21 September. In November, Russian forces withdrew from the city of Kherson and the west bank of the Dnipro — the only regional capital Russia had captured since February. The Nord Stream pipelines were damaged by underwater explosions on 26 September; investigations by several European states have not produced an agreed public conclusion.

Legal and diplomatic response: after votes held in late September that no established international observer body monitored, Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions on 30 September 2022. On 12 October the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-11/4 by 143 votes to 5, with 35 abstentions, declaring the attempted annexation invalid under international law. Russia does not fully control any of the four regions it claims.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative reopens Ukraine’s ports

Background: Ukraine normally supplied a large share of world exports of sunflower oil, maize, barley and wheat. The blockade of its Black Sea ports after February 2022 stranded millions of tonnes in silos and pushed food-price indices to record highs, hitting import-dependent countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa hardest.

What was agreed: on 22 July 2022, parallel agreements brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye were signed in Istanbul, creating a protected corridor from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. A Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, staffed by all four parties, inspected vessels in both directions; a separate memorandum addressed Russian food and fertiliser exports. Global grain prices eased from their spring peak. The mechanism was renewed several times amid Russian complaints about the fertiliser track before ending in July 2023.

Kyiv holds, Bucha is uncovered, Mariupol falls, and Istanbul fails

Military developments: the Russian advance on Kyiv stalled on congested approach routes and was abandoned in late March, with forces redeployed east. The southern port of Mariupol endured a siege of nearly three months; a strike on a theatre sheltering civilians on 16 March and the fall of the Azovstal steelworks in May became defining images of the war.

Humanitarian and legal record: when Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv region at the start of April, bodies of civilians were found in Bucha and neighbouring towns; the ICC prosecutor visited within weeks. On 7 April 2022 the UN General Assembly suspended Russia from the Human Rights Council. On 16 March the International Court of Justice ordered Russia, by thirteen votes to two, to suspend its military operations pending the case — an order Russia did not comply with. Negotiators met in Istanbul on 29 March 2022 and produced a draft framework built around Ukrainian neutrality in exchange for international guarantees; talks collapsed within weeks, and each side blames the other.

Recognition of the separatist republics, then the full-scale invasion

Background and events: Russian forces had massed near Ukraine’s borders through late 2021, and in December 2021 Moscow published draft treaties demanding NATO rule out further enlargement and roll back eastern deployments; the alliance rejected the core demands. On 21 February 2022 Russia recognised the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk republics. On 24 February it launched a full-scale invasion from the north, east and south, describing it as a “special military operation” and citing demilitarisation, “denazification” and the protection of Russian speakers. Ukraine declared martial law and general mobilisation.

International response: a Security Council draft resolution was vetoed by Russia on 25 February. On 2 March 2022 the General Assembly adopted ES-11/1 by 141 votes to 5, with 35 abstentions, deploring the aggression and demanding immediate withdrawal. Sanctions followed within days: immobilisation of Russian central bank reserves, removal of selected banks from SWIFT, airspace closures and export controls. Ukraine filed its ICJ case on 26 February and applied for EU membership on 28 February.

The frozen conflict: monitoring, modernisation and failed formats

The pattern: the line of contact in the Donbas barely moved for six years, but shelling, sniping and casualties continued. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reported ceasefire violations in the thousands each week and was repeatedly restricted in its movements by both sides. The Normandy Format — Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France — met periodically, most substantively in Paris in December 2019, but disagreement over sequencing prevented implementation of Minsk II throughout.

Military and political developments: Ukraine rebuilt its armed forces with Western training missions and in February 2019 wrote the goal of NATO and EU membership into its constitution. Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels at the Kerch Strait in November 2018. Large Russian troop concentrations appeared near the borders in spring and again in autumn 2021. Cyber operations in this period included attacks on Ukrainian power distribution in 2015 and 2016 and the NotPetya malware of 2017, which spread worldwide.

Minsk II: the agreement that never took effect

What was agreed: the September 2014 Minsk Protocol had not stopped the fighting. In early February 2015, with the town of Debaltseve encircled, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France negotiated through the night in Minsk. The Package of Measures of 12 February 2015 set out a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, OSCE monitoring, prisoner exchange, local elections in the occupied areas, constitutional decentralisation and restoration of Ukrainian control over the state border — in that order. The UN Security Council endorsed it in Resolution 2202 on 17 February 2015.

Outcome: Debaltseve fell days after signature. The sequencing dispute proved fatal: Kyiv held that border control must precede elections, Moscow the reverse. No provision beyond partial prisoner exchanges was fully implemented, and Russia declared the agreements void in February 2022.

Crimea is annexed, war begins in the Donbas, and MH17 is shot down

Crimea and the Donbas: on 27 February 2014, days after President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv, armed men without insignia seized the Crimean parliament. A referendum held on 16 March under military control was not recognised by most states; Russia signed a treaty of accession on 18 March. On 27 March 2014 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 68/262 affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity by 100 votes to 11, with 58 abstentions. Armed groups seized administrative buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk from April; fighting escalated through the summer with documented cross-border movements of personnel and equipment, which Russia denied.

MH17 and the response: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, killing all 298 people aboard. The Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team concluded it was destroyed by a Buk missile brought from Russia, and a Dutch court convicted three men in absentia in November 2022; Russia rejects these findings. Russia was suspended from the G8, the EU and United States imposed the first sanctions, moving to sectoral measures in July, and the Minsk Protocol was signed on 5 September 2014.

Euromaidan: a trade agreement becomes a national crisis

What happened: Ukraine had spent years negotiating an Association Agreement and deep free-trade area with the EU, while Moscow made clear that signature would carry trade consequences and offered loans and gas discounts instead. On 21 November 2013 the government suspended preparations to sign at the Vilnius summit. Protests began in Kyiv’s Independence Square that evening and grew after riot police dispersed students on 30 November, broadening from a trade question into a movement against corruption and police violence.

Escalation: new laws restricting protest in January 2014 hardened positions. In the third week of February 2014 around a hundred protesters were killed in central Kyiv. On 21–22 February a negotiated settlement collapsed, Yanukovych left the capital, and parliament voted to remove him from office — a step Russia describes as an unconstitutional coup and Ukraine as a constitutional response to abandonment of office.

The Kharkiv Pact and a formal turn away from NATO

What changed: Viktor Yanukovych won the presidency in February 2010 after the Orange coalition fractured, on a platform of balancing Moscow and Brussels. On 21 April 2010 Ukraine and Russia signed the Kharkiv Pact, extending Russia’s lease on the Sevastopol naval base by 25 years to 2042 in exchange for a gas price discount. Ratification was chaotic and bitterly contested. In July 2010 parliament adopted legislation defining Ukraine as a non-bloc state, removing NATO membership as a declared objective.

Significance: the pact placed the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for a generation and, in hindsight, positioned substantial Russian military infrastructure on the peninsula that would matter in 2014. It also showed how far Ukraine’s external alignment could swing within one electoral cycle.

The NATO Bucharest Summit: membership promised, no path given

What was decided: the summit declaration of 3 April 2008 stated that “Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO”, while declining to grant either a Membership Action Plan — the concrete mechanism. Germany and France resisted the plan; the United States pressed for it. The result was a political commitment without a timetable or process. Russia stated its firm opposition, and in August 2008 a war between Russia and Georgia ended with Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Contested interpretation: one reading holds that the declaration provoked Moscow while leaving Kyiv and Tbilisi unprotected — the worst of both options. Another holds that alliance membership is a sovereign choice under the Helsinki principles and that Russian objections confer no veto. Both are widely held in the academic literature and neither is a settled fact.

The Orange Revolution: an election annulled and rerun

What happened: the presidential run-off of 21 November 2004 between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko was declared for Yanukovych amid extensive fraud allegations recorded by domestic and international observers. Hundreds of thousands of protesters occupied central Kyiv in freezing weather; Yushchenko had been poisoned with dioxin during the campaign. Ukraine’s Supreme Court annulled the run-off and ordered a repeat vote on 26 December 2004, which Yushchenko won. Power passed without violence — a rare outcome in the post-Soviet space at the time.

Significance: the episode established that Ukrainian street mobilisation could overturn an electoral result, hardened perceptions in Moscow of Western-backed political change on its borders, and began the pattern of Ukrainian politics alternating sharply between European and Russian orientations.

The Friendship Treaty and the division of the Black Sea Fleet

What was signed: on 31 May 1997 Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, in which each recognised the other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. Accompanying agreements divided the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and leased base facilities in Sevastopol to Russia until 2017. On 9 July 1997 Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, establishing consultation without any membership commitment.

Significance: 1997 settled on paper the two hardest questions left by the Soviet collapse — borders and the fleet. Ukraine allowed Russia to remain in Sevastopol; Russia recognised Crimea as Ukrainian. The treaty was in force until Ukraine allowed it to lapse in 2019, and it is frequently cited in legal argument because it is a ratified bilateral instrument, unlike the Budapest Memorandum.

The Budapest Memorandum: nuclear weapons traded for assurances

What was signed: at independence Ukraine held the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world — roughly 1,900 strategic warheads inherited from the Soviet Union, without the command-and-control codes to use them. On 5 December 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state; the other three committed to respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to seek Security Council action if Ukraine were threatened with nuclear weapons. Warhead transfers to Russia were completed by 1996.

The crucial distinction: the document provides assurances, not guarantees. It contains no defence obligation and no enforcement mechanism. Ukrainian governments have cited it repeatedly since 2014; the legal debate about its status is unresolved.

Ukraine votes for independence

What happened: the Ukrainian parliament declared independence on 24 August 1991, days after the failed coup in Moscow. A referendum on 1 December 1991 confirmed it with about 92.3 per cent in favour on a turnout above 84 per cent. Majorities voted yes in every region, including Crimea and the eastern industrial oblasts — a fact often omitted from later accounts of a permanently divided country. Leonid Kravchuk was elected president the same day, and on 8 December 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezha Accords declaring that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.